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Abstract 
How leaders make decisions in complex and chaotic environments could 
have a significant impact on organizational performance. This study of leaders from 
across the Department of Defense (DoD) provides the foundation by which a more 
informed understanding of how program managers’ sense of situational reality 
ultimately leads to timely and relevant decisions.  This study specifically focuses on 
the emergence of four aggregate categories—sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, 
and explicit knowledge—that seem to shape the leader’s reality and subsequent 
decision-making process in highly complex environments. I refer to the integrated 
nature of these categories as nousmaking, or making reality of the situation and 
choices based on one’s sense of the reality. Ultimately, these factors determine the 
velocity and quality of the decisions leading to overall organizational effectiveness. 
Understanding the underlying nature by which leaders gain a sense of reality within 
the decision-making environment will help shape future organizational structures and 
processes as well as leader development. 
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Introduction 
Despite the many Department of Defense (DoD) successes, many of the 
DoD’s programs and operations are still vulnerable to underperformance and 
excessive cost growth during times of increasingly constrained budgets. Since 1975, 
there have been an annual array of studies, beginning with the Packard 
Commission, that have had virtually no impact on the ever-increasing trend of cost 
growth and substandard program performance. Successfully addressing these 
challenges can yield fiscal dividends that the Department could use to meet priorities 
such as readiness and modernization needs.  
The DOD continues to struggle to overcome the many problems brought 
about by over a decade of war and the need to accelerate the procurement of 
capability, while fighting on several fronts around the world. Often, the necessity of 
speed of delivery, resulting in underperforming programs, has spuriously suggested 
that program management is the root cause of program underperformance. The 
consequence of this assumption has been legislative language that tends to address 
program leaders’ motivations and incentives, rather than the root causes of program 
managers making decisions that often have little impact on program performance.  
Although the DOD has increased its procurement budget over the years, it 
consistently pays more and takes longer than planned to develop systems that do 
not perform as anticipated. The DoD spends over $100 billion a year in contracting 
for goods and services. Over the last few years, the DOD has made several broad-
based changes to its acquisition and contracting processes to improve DoD–
contractor relationships and rules and has given attention to acquisition reform 
initiatives with little real improvement. The most glaring example of this failure is the 
termination of the DoD’s Joint Tactical Radio System, which cost over $17 billion, 
with little return for the investment. 
It is time to examine the root causes of DoD program challenges from a more 
scientific perspective, rather than from the traditional organizational theory and 
policy view. The policy changes that have attempted to create efficiencies by using 
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commercial best practices, portfolio management, and additional oversite have failed 
to produce their intended results. A deeper understanding of how leaders make 
decisions and the mitigating impacts of those decisions is necessary to truly change 
the acquisition framework in a way that will result in an improved return on 
investment for defense materiel development programs. The problem this research 
seeks to understand is the underlying nature of why program manager’s decision 
making does not consistently manifest in improved program performance. This study 
is being conducted in two phases. Phase I of this study is a qualitative research 
effort based upon grounded theory. The results of this study will provide the basis for 
a quantitative study in which measurable factors such as organizational structure 
and policy will be examined with regard to the leader’s ability to link a sense of 
situational understanding with the structural realities of the business environment. 
Commensurate with this problem are the questions that help guide this research, 
presented in the following section. 
Phase I 
The initial qualitative research is focused on the first two questions: 
a. What is the underlying nature of how decision makers gain a sense of 
reality by which their decisions are subsequently informed within the 
unique construct of their functional framework? 
b. How do program managers of Major Defense Acquisition Programs 
(MDAPs) make sense of complex and chaotic program environments, and 
does this differ from other professions that operate in complex 
environments? 
This study is predicated on the basic assumption that there is an inherent 
process by which an individual makes decisions. This process involves a deliberate 
problem-solving methodology and a less-well-defined cognitive and interactive 
process that influences the ability of the decision maker to gain a sense of reality. 
While the overall research effort will be a mixed methods approach, the initial study 
is a qualitative descriptive approach based upon grounded theory. This report begins 
to address the first question in Phase I and will support subsequent research 
through which the initial theory will emerge in support of Phase II. 
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Phase II 
Findings from this qualitative study will provide the basis for the subsequent 
quantitative study, which will assess the relationship between a leader’s sense of 
derived reality and the influences of their particular operational framework. Phase II 
will compare decision making in various phases of the program based upon a 
network analysis of cost and predetermined common units of value. By mapping 
value networks for MDAPs, and analyzing them relative to the leader’s decision-
making process at key cost and value drivers, known as hubs, greater insight will be 
gained into the leader’s ability to impact overall program performance. By mapping 
the cost and value networks of program management organizations, we will be able 
to focus our attention on the critical nodes that represent cost and revenue drivers 
and perhaps have a deeper insight into the manifest decision making at critical 
junctures in the program. Additionally, characterizing the fundamental nature with 
which decisions are influenced at critical times in the program evolution, as observed 
through its network growth structure over time, we may be able to better understand 
the effects of policy and organizational influencers on the outcome of the program. 
The underlying factors that inform the PM’s sense of reality and how those factors 
impact the subsequent decision process will allow us to establish specific causal 
relationships that affect program outcomes at critical nodes in cost and value of the 
program.  
Phase I is grounded in the naturalistic tradition and using a longitudinal 
qualitative, ethnographic approach to better understand the dynamics and processes 
of individuals making decisions in a group environment under volatile, uncertain, 
complex, and ambiguous (VUCA) conditions. By understanding the constructs from 
with which a program manager derives a sense of reality and understanding of the 
nature of the world perhaps we can gain insight into how to better inform that reality, 
leading to more effective judgements and decisions. 
We will focus on programs that are at Technology Readiness Level (TRL) six 
or higher, as defined by the DoD TRL Guide (Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Research and Engineering, 2011). This study will examine many complex decision-
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 4 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
making environments and compare the fundamental nature of these environments 
with each other and their relative effectiveness. By exploring a wide variety of 
complex and chaotic leadership environments, and ultimately cross-coding them, 
perhaps we can gain a more informed view of how individuals respond to adversity. 
Ultimately, this insight can lead to better organizational understanding and the 
changes that will have a greater chance of success. 
Phase I leverages previous studies on decision makers in complex and 
chaotic environments such as Operational Detachment A (ODA) team leaders in 
highly volatile and ambiguous situations. While the scenarios are different than 
procurement environments, there are common themes which will help us to better 
understand why some decisions result in success and some in failure when they are 
eventually shaped by the functional construct within which they are made. The 
purpose of this analysis is to reveal a deeper understanding of the very nature of 
how individuals establish a sense of reality within the context of a complex 
ambiguous decision-making environment. 
Driskell and Salas (1991) presented two conclusions that are extremely 
relevant to this research. First, “under stress, group members will defer more to the 
opinions, ideas, and actions of the group leader” (p. 473–478). This implies that in a 
stressful time, support staffs will begin to defer more to the leader instead of being 
the unbiased and objective voice for the leader that informs the leader of the cost of 
operations, in terms of the manpower, resources, time, and risk involved.  Driskell 
and Salas’ conclusions could help us to understand how fundamental confidence is 
shaped based upon the leader support structure. Driskell and Salas (1991) also 
explained that “at the same time, the leader will be more likely to reject input from 
group members” (Driskell & Salas, p. 473). This implies that if the staff were to 
remain impartial and act as a voice of reason for the leader, the leader who is under 
stress would disregard the guidance and counsel of the staff and make a decision 
based on either inadequate information (ignored or discounted information) or 
intuition (Riabacke, 2006). Hence, the dynamics of external influences becomes a 
factor in how leaders perceive and respond to their environment, possibly influencing 
their sense of reality within the construct of their situation. 
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Understanding how the complexity of the situation influences the decision 
maker at a base level will lead us to a richer understanding of the decision process 
as we begin to contextualize it within a functional context. The culture of an 
organization will influence how the organization makes decisions (Riabacke, 2006). 
Organizations can predict outcomes by examining the epistemic motivation of the 
staff. With a higher pro-social motivation, the staff or team will be more likely to 
search, encode, and retrieve information that is more conducive and consistent with 
group goals (De Dreu, Nijstad, & van Knippenberg, 2008). Furthermore, the 
research of Kruglanski and Webster in 1996 shows that the staff is likely to “seize 
and freeze” when it comes to a quick solution, rather than an accurate one, and that 
once the staff reaches closure, they are usually unmovable (De Dreu et al., 2008).  
What Is Decision Making?  
Research on decision making has focused more on the organizational and 
environmental influence of the leader and less on the inherent contextual interaction 
by which leaders make decisions. For example, models such as the Cynefin 
Framework (Snowden & Boone, 2007) are used to better understand the decision-
making process in environments that range from simple to chaotic. This model 
describes chaotic environments as those in which relationships between cause and 
effect are impossible to determine because they are constantly changing and never 
develop a manageable pattern. Hence, Snowden & Boone (2007) suggest that the 
leader is simply reacting with the intent of eventually creating the conditions by 
which a pattern can emerge, migrating the environment into one of complexity rather 
than chaos.  
Complexity tends to be viewed as something with many parts that interact 
with each other in many ways (“Complexity,” n.d.). More specifically, complex 
decision environments tend to involve many interacting and non-linear elements, 
and can be retrospective when viewed from a historical perspective, resulting in 
agents that tend to constrain themselves over time (Snowden & Boone, 2007). While 
these definitions are important to understanding the environment within which the 
leader makes decisions, the research has not provided an understanding the 
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cognitive processes by which the decision maker formulates a sense of perspective 
and understanding of the situational reality and subsequently translates this reality 
into effective decisions. 
Kathleen Eisenhardt (1989) suggests in her study, Making Fast Strategic 
Decisions in High Velocity Environments, that performance (or effective decisions) is 
a function of speed which results from a number of key mediating processes, 
including accelerated cognitive processing. The ability to make “speedy” decisions of 
sufficient quality is directly related to the effectiveness of the decision. The notion 
that effective decisions are related to confidence in the decisions is the basis upon 
which this study is focused. How decision makers create the reality within which they 
develop a sense of confidence and conviction in their choices is fundamental to 
understanding the relative relationship between effective and non-effective 
outcomes. 
Phase I of this research effort focuses on the leader’s ability to create a sense 
of reality of the complex decision environment. Phase II will explore how this reality 
influences the speed and quality of decisions at critical points in the program where 
cost and program value seem to reach their highs and lows. A basic model for 
decision speed and quality are introduced in this study as a means of establishing 
the framework for Phase II. 
Nousmaking 
Initial findings indicate that there are four basic categories that decision 
makers seem to consistently exhibit when confronted with chaotic and complex 
problems. These emerging categories were observed in our initial round of 
interviews with Special Operations (ODA) soldiers and will be the basis of 
subsequent interviews of program managers’ decision making in complex and 
chaotic environments. These four categories include sensemaking, trust, tacit 
knowledge, and explicit knowledge. Because of the strong interaction of these four 
categories with regard to influencing the ability of the decision maker to interpret and 
come to a state of reality (Nous), I refer to this interaction as Nousmaking, a 
necessary process for “speedy” and quality decisions that lead to enhanced 
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performance or effective decision outcomes. Within Eisenhardt’s (1989) model of 
decision making, Nousmaking would encompass the key mediating process, in 
particular cognitive processing. The interaction of these four aggregate categories 
was shown to be present in all of the decision environments described by the ODA 
leaders. 
A situation can consist of random, unordered events that cloud judgment and 
may impact the problem-solving ability of the decision maker. While the defense 
program environment may not have the same immediate impact to life, the random 
and inconsistent nature of events can be just as relevant to the decision maker and 
can lead to second- and third-order effects, which can then lead to major adverse 
programmatic impacts. The increasingly complex nature of today’s technical and 
programmatic environment, coupled with the uncertainty of future security threats to 
the nation, provides for a complex and chaotic environment, similar to other fields at 
their base level that are trying to understand the stimulus under which the decision 
maker is formulating a sense of perspective or reality. Additionally, the value of the 
decisions made in context with the environmental inputs and preferred outcomes 
can be a seemingly random series of events influenced by the VUCA nature of the 
environment.  
Being able to arrive at a true meaning of the environment and see the reality 
of a situation is referred to as Nous, which in classical philosophy refers to the ability 
to understand what is true or real (“Nous”, 1973). Nous is often referred to as the 
equivalent of perception that works within the mind (Rorty, 1979). This paper 
illustrates that, in order to achieve a level of perception necessary to translate into 
an effective decision, there is an inherent level of understanding and processing that 
must occur, which includes sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit 
knowledge. 
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Theoretical Framework  
This research leverages the data, information, knowledge, wisdom (DIKW) 
framework as a loose model upon which to understand the evolution of insight within 
the decision-making process (see Figure 1).  
 
Figure 1: Data, Information, Knowledge, Wisdom (DIKW) Framework 
The DIKW pyramid—also known as the DIKW hierarchy, wisdom hierarchy, 
knowledge hierarchy, information hierarchy, or data pyramid (Rowley, 2007)—refers 
loosely to a class of models for representing purported structural and/or functional 
relationships. This basic model proves useful in our research, in that it reflects the 
insight gained through a deliberate evolution from the “lifeless” unknown of pure 
data, to the novel insight of wisdom. As one is immersed in a situationally complex 
environment, making sense of it is predicated on the “data” one internalizes. Lacking 
any other context, this initial source of input is just as lifeless as the data described 
in the DIKW model. It is not until a higher level of context is applied to the data that 
the situation begins to come alive with regard to context. Additionally, this model 
makes no dispersions on the type of data or the functional environment in which it 
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resides. This definitization begins to occur as the consumer of the data begins to 
shape it within the context of their environment and derives value and insight as the 
data transforms along the DIKW framework. 
With this as a point of reference, Figure 2 represents a loosely constructed 
hierarchical model that represents the evolution of “knowing” in the decision-making 
process, which I refer to as the Decision Clarity Model (DCM). 
 
 
Figure 2: Decision Clarity Model 
The DCM represents an evolution of knowing in that at the base level, there 
exists simply a random, context-free environment consisting of volatility, uncertainty, 
complexity, and ambiguity. The specific context at this point is not yet relevant other 
than to say that this environment can exist across many functional domains. It is not 
until the participant in this environment begins to perceive the environment and 
applies it to a particular functional construct that the decision-making context 
becomes relevant. 
Conceptual Nousmaking is the point at which the participant begins to make 
sense of the complex environment through an internal struggle of what is real and 
relevant. This brings us to our first hypothesis: that there are four key attributes that 
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influence how a decision maker understands and reacts to a particular complex 
environment.  
Hypothesis 1: There are four aggregate categories that shape 
and influence a Program Manager’s understanding of a 
complex environment, consisting of sensemaking, trust, tacit 
knowledge, and explicit knowledge. 
 
Table 1, summarizes the four categories and the respective attributes associated 
with each specific category. 
Table 1. Conceptual Nousmaking Categories 
Second Order Analytic Code Aggregate Category 
1.  Retrospective 
Sensemaking 
2.  Plausibility 
3.  Social Identity 
4.  Organizing 
5.  Ability 
Trust 6.  Benevolence 
7.  Integrity 
8.  Experience 
Tacit Knowledge 
9.  Know-how 
10.  Codified 
Explicit Knowledge 11.  Logical 
12. Deduction 
 
Hypothesis 1 will be explored in subsequent interviews with program 
managers and other leaders that operate in complex environments. Continuous 
coding will be conducted from subsequent interviews of program managers. This will 
allow refinement and validation of the initial categories until we have reached a point 
of saturation. At this point, theory can be proposed upon which Phase II will be 
quantitatively assessed using the hypothetical deductive process.  
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The following definitions for the four categories show the inherent relationship 
with their associated attributes. The initial data collected during initial interviews 
correlates to the attributes that were derived from initial coding of interviews. 
1. Sensemaking is the process by which people give meaning to 
experience and is characterized by the following properties (Weick, 
1995: 
a.  Identity—helps people identify who they are and shapes what they 
enact and how they interpret events (Currie, & Brown, 2003; 
Thurlow & Mills, 2009; Watson, 2009; Weick, Sutcliff, & Obstfeld, 
2005) 
b. Retrospection—provides the conditions for sensemaking, such as 
attention and interruptions, which impact what people notice 
(Dunford & Jones, 2000). 
c. Organizing—is where individuals simultaneously shape and react to 
the environment they face. Thurlow and Mills (2009) suggest that 
individuals will project themselves into an environment and observe 
the consequences they learn about their identities and the accuracy 
of their understanding of the event. 
d. Plausibility—is more relevant to sensemaking than accuracy since 
the world is filled with people who have multiple shifting identities 
(Weick, 1995). This reinforces the value of a larger study group and 
allows the researcher to explore the possibility of theoretical 
perspectives. 
2. Trust is the willingness of an individual to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another based upon the expectations that the other will perform a 
particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to 
monitor or control the other party. While there are several terms 
associated with trust, three characteristics tend to appear frequently in 
studies associated with trust (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995): 
a. Ability—is a group of skills, competencies, and characteristics that 
enable a party to have influence within some specific domain 
(Zand, 1972). 
b. Benevolence—is the extent to which a trustee is believed to want to 
do good to the trustor, independent of personal profit motive (Mayer 
et al., 1995). Additionally, Rosen and Jerdee (1977) considered the 
likelihood that the trustee would put the organization’s goals ahead 
of his or her own goals. 
c. Integrity—is the trustor’s perception that the trustee will adhere to a 
set of principles the trustor finds acceptable (McFall, 1987). 
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3. Tacit knowledge is knowledge that is difficult to transfer to another 
individual by means of writing or verbalization (Polanyi, 1958). 
Effectively, it is knowledge that one seems to have acquired and that 
cannot easily be transferred to another individual, even for extremely 
complex tasks or situations. Polanyi refers to tacit knowledge as “we can 
know more than we can tell” (Polanyi, 1966). Tacit knowledge can be 
characterized by the following: 
a. Know-how—involves learning and skill that was acquired through 
means other than writing them down. Knowing how, or embodied 
knowledge, is characteristic of an expert who acts and makes 
judgements without explicitly reflecting on the principles or rules 
involved (Schmidt & Hunter, 1993) 
b. Experience—is a key to tacit knowledge in that without some form 
of shared experience, it would be difficult for people to share each 
other’s thinking processes (Lam, 2000), and thus it would be 
difficult to anticipate the actions of others, given a common 
framework and understanding. 
4. Explicit knowledge can be readily articulated, codified, and accessed 
(Helie & Sun, 2010). Thus, explicit knowledge can be generated through 
logical deduction and acquired through both formal and informal means, 
such as practical experience within a relevant context. 
Interfield Theory 
Interfield theory is a cross disciplinary study that explores the common 
relationships between various fields (Darden & Maull, 1977). It is this theory upon 
which we are able to explore how the volatile environment and conceptual decision 
making in one discipline relates to another discipline. While the intent is to 
understand what influences the decision making of program managers in complex 
situations, this paper predominately explores the first two layers of the Decision 
Clarity Model, recognizing that the Functional Clarity level introduces a specific 
context to the Nousmaking within different disciplines. For example, the functional 
clarity a program manager experiences is based upon the defense acquisition 
framework, while the functional clarity for Special Operations soldiers is grounded in 
the combat framework. The DCM assumes that the first two layers of the process 
are neutral with regard to the situation. Within our definition of Nousmaking, the four 
categories of sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge support 
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theoretical discussions within other disciplines, such as organizational theory, 
psychology, behavioral science, and so forth.  
Interfield theory allows us to identify common patterns at the subconscious 
level of decision making that can subsequently lead us to a richer understanding of 
how decisions are made independent of policy and regulation. Introducing the 
functional clarity of the participant’s unique operational framework, we will be able to 
separate the influence of the environmental framework from the innate process of 
rationalizing a situation. Once the Deliberate Decision Making and Decision 
Outcome layers are introduced into the scenario, it will become clear how 
nousmaking shapes the outcome of decisions and their relative impact. This leads to 
our second hypothesis: 
 Hypothesis 2: Nousmaking is independent of the functional clarity of the 
operational environment in which choices are formulated. 
Hypothesis 2 does not presume that the individual’s personal experiences and 
bias are not relevant to formulating a sense of reality. We are simply suggesting that 
the aggregate categories that make up the Nousmaking process influence the 
individual’s objective reality similarly, regardless of disciplines, and that the 
subsequent decision making and outcome are influenced and can be altered by the 
exigent factors of the functional environment in which the individual’s reality has 
previously been established.  
By establishing a demarcation between Nousmaking and decision making 
within a functional construct, a leader’s ability to formulate a speedy high-quality 
decision is impacted by the ability to both establish a sense of reality as well as 
respond to the unique constructs of a particular functional setting, and one informs 
the other. This line of reasoning could lead us to a better understanding of why some 
leaders prevail and some do not, given the same functional constraints. 
A large portion of a leader’s ability to make a decision is his or her reliance on 
past experiences. Leaders are selected after a careful scrutiny of records and 
evaluations by a centralized panel of senior officers. Research shows that in an 
experienced-based choice, decisions are made from memories of past outcomes, 
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concluding that memory biases may play a role in the overweighting of extreme 
outcomes and causing more risk seeking behavior, as demonstrated in the 
preceding paragraph (Ludvig, Madan, & Spetch, 2013). Ludvig et al cite five studies 
that conclude that a bias exists in which “highly salient and emotional events are 
over weighted in memory tasks” (Ludvig et al., 2013). Another conclusion reached is 
that extreme outcomes are more likely to be retrieved at the time of a decision and 
that this may be a heuristic used to simplify the situation at hand and to limit the 
number of outcomes considered (Ludvig et al., 2013). Ludvig et al.’s research would 
suggest that there are core processes at work at the base layer at which reality is 
created that may influence a leader’s perspective and will necessarily influence or 
predetermine the decision strategy within the functional environmental constraint. 
Studying emergent patterns in transition from a predictable normal routine–centric 
environment to one of chaos and unpredictability may have significant relevance 
across various functional domains. The appreciation for the potential of chaos in 
decision making may have potential relevance in the understanding of both the 
nonlinearity of making decisions as well as the functional aspects of instability as a 
means for adapting to new situations in any VUCA environment. Understanding the 
chaotic and volatile decision-making environment of the battlefield may yield an 
increased clarity and potential for interpreting decision making in a variety of 
dynamic and nonlinear decision-making environments. According to Keil (1995), 
nonlinearity refers to behavior in which the relationships between variables in a 
system are dynamic and disproportionate, whose outcomes are subject to high 
levels of uncertainty and unpredictability.  
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Method 
Interpretive Approach to Understanding Decision Making in 
Complex Environments 
This study was predicated on the basic assumption that there is an inherent 
process by which an individual makes decisions and that this process involves a 
deliberate problem-solving methodology (Drucker, 1967) and a less-well-defined 
cognitive and interactive process, which influences the ability of the decision maker 
to arrive at a sense of clarity in ambiguous conditions. Similar to the Buddhist 
understanding of self and environment in which everything around us is a reflection 
of our inner lives and is perceived through the self and alters according to the inner 
state (SGI Quarterly, 1995), this study explored the notion that there are other 
intrinsic factors involved in decision making that influence the effectiveness of these 
decisions. Phase I research adopts a qualitative descriptive approach based upon 
grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), in which the interpretations and 
experiences of the participants remained in the foreground, notwithstanding the fact 
that some of the interviewers tended to have similar backgrounds and experiences 
as those being interviewed. During the initial interviews, it was important to maintain 
a sense of separation from the interviewee in order to limit the bias toward 
preconceived understanding of the specific events being discussed. In keeping with 
the approach described by Gioia with regard to giving voice to the informants, it was 
important to recognize the researcher’s expertise, and interpret this pattern in the 
data, thus providing the best opportunity for discovering new concepts or 
relationships between existing concepts (Gioia, Corley, & Hamilton, 2012. 
While the overall research is focused on program manager decision making 
in complex and chaotic environments, I was initially interested in a variety of 
decision-making environments in order to begin to address both hypotheses 
presented in this paper. The first unit of measure was special operations forces in 
complex and chaotic conditions and how they developed a sense of reality within 
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the context of these situations. This analysis supports the categorical definitization 
of the elements within which reality is shaped, or what we are calling Nousmaking.  
Participant Selection 
This initial research study selected participants from a pool of available 
graduate students within the Defense Analysis Department of the Naval 
Postgraduate School. Candidates were solicited from the student body enrolled in 
the Defense Analysis program via email. Respondents were screened and selected 
based on a required set of criteria, resulting in the identification of 20 research 
participants. Each participant was interviewed for approximately 60–90 minutes 
during a semi-structured interview conducted in-person by one of nine identified 
researchers.  
In order to participate in the research study, participants needed to satisfy a 
number of selection criteria. First, they had to be United States military officers who 
had served in a leadership position in Iraq or Afghanistan. Second, they had to have 
experienced complex decision-making situations while in a position of leadership. 
The final selection focused on Army Operational Detachment–Alpha (ODA) and 
Navy Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) team leaders. These team leaders tended to have 
significant exposure to chaotic combat environments, and were in positions to make 
critical decisions affecting both themselves and their teams. Team leaders from 
these units were in the rank of O3-O5, the equivalent of captains, majors, and 
lieutenant colonels in the Army or lieutenants, lieutenant commanders, and 
commanders in the Navy. This selection of personnel resulted in an exclusively male 
research pool, and excluded military officers from the Air Force and Marines, due to 
either inconsistent exposure to similar ground combat operations or lack of 
availability within the current student body.  
The primary operational element of a Special Forces company, or Special 
Forces ODA, also known as an “A Detachment” or “A-Team,” consists of 12 Special 
Forces soldiers: 2 officers and 10 sergeants. All team members are Special Forces 
qualified and cross-trained in different skills. They are also multi-lingual. The A-
Team is almost unlimited in its capabilities to operate in hostile or denied areas. A-
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Teams can infiltrate and exfiltrate their area of operations by air, land, or sea. An A-
Team can operate for an indefinite period of time in remote locations with little or no 
outside support. They are independent, self-sustaining “detachments.” A-Teams 
routinely train, advise, and assist other U.S. and allied forces and other agencies 
while standing by to perform other special operations as directed by higher 
authorities. All detachment members are capable of advising, assisting, and 
directing foreign counterparts in their function up through battalion level 
(GlobalSecurity.org).  
Operations in a chaotic combat environment can cause heightened stress, 
anxiety, and emotion. Potential risk factors for this research effort included 
participants being asked to detail painful and traumatic memories and trigger topics 
that might have caused post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). As we designed our 
interview questions, pre-screened, and selected participants, we took extreme 
precaution in generating questions that solely contributed to our research 
objectives. We made a concerted effort as interviewers not to ask specific details 
about a past situation but rather to ask questions that established and described 
the decision-making process of the participant. We established boundaries with the 
participants and designed alternative lines of questioning if we felt the participant 
was uncomfortable in any way.  
Data 
The intent of Phase I of this research was to interview a broad spectrum of 
leaders from varying complex environments and to build a baseline of common 
categories that exist between the various disciplines. While this initial study 
leveraged interviews from Special Operations leaders, follow-on interviews will look 
at a minimum of at least 30 program managers from a broad spectrum of programs 
that include both challenged programs as well as programs that are performing well 
against their predetermined baseline. 
Data collection for this first round of interviews included three primary 
sources: (1) tapes and transcripts of the subject interviews; (2) briefings from subject 
matter experts regarding the operational concepts of ODA teams; and (3) interview 
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debriefing with the entire research team as well as self-debrief and analysis of the 
data. As part of this research, we used conventional ethnographic analysis methods 
through the use of memos, notes, and subjective interpretations of the subject’s 
experience depictions. The focus was mainly on the description of events through 
language by the interviewees to gain meaning to support the experimental 
interpretation. Analysis of the interviews in a group setting provided varying 
perspectives of the data, allowing me to explore alternative interpretations and 
category development. This provided the basis upon which a theoretical direction 
could be established. The interviews and subsequent interpretation provided a rich 
basis of data from which to begin to establish a theoretical understanding of the 
cognitive processes involved in decision making in VUCA environments.  
Understanding and subsequent theory requires plausibility, direction, 
centrality, and adequacy (Charmaz, 2014). It was important to ensure that the 
descriptive data provided by the interviewees was plausible, lending itself to the 
development of emerging categories. Throughout this process, a method of constant 
comparison (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) was used from the many different subject 
interviews. The data from the interviews was coded, categorized, and evaluated until 
a systemic pattern began to emerge. The first order coding was the critical link to 
developing the emergent theory. Incident-by-incident coding was used to compare 
the relevant ideas identified in the various interviews (Charmaz, 2014). The initial 
coding helped to establish correlation between the incidents and was the basis from 
which a framework of understanding evolved. 
In order to establish emerging themes, the informants’ initial incident coding 
was put into context and compared against each other. As themes began to emerge, 
theoretical sampling was used to further elaborate and refine the initial categories. 
Initially, sensemaking seemed to have a significant effect on the participant’s ability 
to shape the reality of the situation, but it became clear through further research and 
the memos that there might be a more complex set of variables helping to shape the 
participant’s reality and subsequent decision-making process. Throughout the 
interviews, I kept asking myself why an individual with relatively few years of 
experience generally made the “right” decision under seemingly life-altering 
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situations. This question will be critical to further examine as program managers 
begin to be interviewed and cross coded with the results from other leader’s 
experiences. Understanding the basis of this phenomenon could have significant 
impact in helping to shape the conditions for other complex decision-making 
environments.  
While the respondents kept attributing their successes to their formal training, 
this simply did not reveal itself as the primary causal factor in the data. Through 
theoretical sampling from the various interviews, I was able to develop the properties 
of my categories until I reached a point of saturation, the point at which I was not 
able to develop new information from the data (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Subsequent 
interviews of PMs will follow the same method, providing an even richer body of 
knowledge, which will add validity to the process of determining the overall 
aggregate categories of Nousmaking. 
Data Analysis 
Initial respondent coding began to reveal 12 second-order analytical codes 
that seemed to be interacting throughout the incidents under investigation. These 
included retrospection, plausibility, social identity, organizing, ability, benevolence, 
integrity, experience, know-how, codified knowledge, logical knowledge, and 
deductive knowledge. Through theoretical sampling and continuous probing of the 
data from all of the interviews, these 12 areas continued to emerge, leading me to 
four aggregate categories—sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit 
knowledge—as characteristics influencing the decision maker during the events 
being described. These categories seemed to have the closest alignment with the 
emergent themes and, upon further research, revealed themselves as the most 
plausible description of the process characteristics being described. 
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Second-order analytic codes (Table 1) are characteristics associated with the 
aggregate categories and were revealed during the specific events being described 
by the participant. As the second-order analytic codes began to emerge, it was 
useful to begin to search for categories that helped to explain my observations. The 
four categories—sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge—
seemed to align with the emerging data. 
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Findings 
The emerging findings reflect the results of initial interviews and begin to 
formulate the foundation for the aggregate categories. These initial interviews are 
simply the first pass through Phase I, setting the baseline by which we will be able to 
assess subsequent interviews of leaders in other fields such as program 
management. 
While this study examined a number of disparate scenarios that involved 
multiple key leaders, the overall nature of their stories maintained a sense of 
sameness in that the backgrounds and experiences of the respondents were 
relatively similar and the volatile nature and potential consequences of the outcomes 
were similar. Close examination of the descriptions of the events shows that 
characteristics of the four aggregate categories seemed to emerge from the data 
and manifest themselves on a consistent basis. It is helpful to retrospectively 
examine particular events within this context.  
Sample Scenario #1 
The following scenario reflects aspects of all four of the aggregate categories 
being present in a very short period of time. It is helpful to examine an incident more 
closely to extract the relevant categories as they are manifesting themselves in time.  
In the following scenario, I show how the categories interplay throughout the 
event.  
It just happened to be that as we drove into the ambush line I was the 
guy that saw it because I’m facing right into it. It was extremely dark 
and as we passed an alley there was a split second where the 
illumination was perfect and I see two guys moving into the alley and 
they’re carrying what looks to be a pipe in their hands, and it seems 
like an eternity but it was one of those pretty quick, “this is about to go 
south fast” as fast as I could get the barrel of the 50 Cal machine gun 
back on the alley, didn’t have time to yell, or anything, it was just an 
immediate reaction, get the gun up and start to shoot. 
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During this moment, the respondent’s perspective on the environment is 
interrupted by the glimpse of an image that has meaning from past experience and 
establishes a sense of plausibility that the situation has changed into one of 
immediacy requiring further action. These characteristics are synonymous with 
sensemaking as well as experience from past situations, exhibiting traits of tacit 
knowledge. The immediate action taken by the respondent also suggests that a level 
of explicit knowledge of both tactical employment of the weapon system and use of 
that system was well ingrained. The combination of sensemaking and tacit and 
explicit knowledge forged the insight and immediate decisions during that moment.  
I determined though that we had the initiative, we could either push 
past the ambush line, which in retrospect would have been a horrible 
mistake because there was a second ambush line that was dug in up 
the road (we didn’t know that at the time). I decided at that moment 
that we had the initiative, we had been caught in a well prepared 
ambush, but we hadn’t sustained any casualties, as far as I could tell 
we hadn’t sustained any damage, we were still fully capable and we 
were so close that it made sense to turn into the ambush which was an 
old trick from Vietnam, sometimes you go right at the ambush line and 
you have a chance of breaking through it. And so that’s the order that I 
gave on the spot, and we have an SOP for that as well. I gave them 
“echelon left” and we attacked through the ambush line and we 
completely obliterated them. 
At this moment during the event, the respondent continues to shape the 
decision through sensemaking and tacit and explicit knowledge, but also 
incorporates a level of trust in that the respondent believes that the group’s skills and 
competencies will influence the outcome of the event. Additionally, the respondent 
believes that the men in his team will adhere to the principles to which they were 
trained and the respondent feels is acceptable to the situation. All four second-order 
aggregate categories were involved during this scenario with the combined effect of 
high velocity and high quality choices, which ultimately resulted in an effective 
decision for the situation.  
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Sample Scenario #2 
In this example, the respondent exhibited a high degree of identity and 
responsibility to his higher command. This officer is a relatively junior officer placed 
in charge of an elite reconnaissance (RECON) unit responsible for brigade-level 
missions. Attaining this position was considered an honor and failing in this role 
would have both personal and organizational level adverse impacts. The RECON 
unit was charged with finding an enemy group that was creating havoc on local 
villages with mortar fire. On this particular evening, the RECON unit found the 
enemy group in question and was attempting to gain permission to engage with their 
own mortar fire. Permission was required due to the brigade rules of engagement in 
place at the time. The respondent repeatedly attempted to gain contact with his 
higher headquarters, but for unknown reasons was not able to establish contact. 
Fearing that they would lose the opportunity, the respondent described, 
I’m not going to let them get away … realizing like these guys fired 
one shot already, second shots probably coming soon and then 
probably going to fire third shot and then be gone. All this was 
being processed and like less than a minute you know. … I think I 
tried to call twice on the radio with no response and I still don’t 
know if it just was getting through or the antenna … so making the 
command decision on the ground I decided to do a direct lay with 
the mortars. … I’d say flash to bang I would say probably 3½ to 4 
minutes and in 5½ minutes … brigade commander was on the radio 
telling us “hey what are you doing firing mortars? Tell them to stop 
… here I am like oh I just did direct lay and I’m getting a call from 
the brigade commander thinking that I used indirect fire it’s an 
obvious mortar explosion … going to come down right now to 
relieve me. 
This short chaotic moment in time reflects all the characteristics of the 
second-order analytical codes in play, for example, sensemaking, in that there was a 
sense of identity at work with regard to being in charge of an elite unit with a high-
profile mission. Failure was not an option. Not only did this reflect social identity, but 
it also reflected a level of benevolence, in that the respondent wanted to succeed for 
the brigade commander and did not exhibit personal profit motive behind this 
position. Indeed, the brigade relied on this unit, that is, the junior officer, to succeed 
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in eliminating the enemy and placed a level of trust in his ability. The fact that the 
respondent was concerned about the brigade commander relieving him reflected a 
recognition that there might be a perceived violation of the trust bestowed upon him 
and the Recon unit by the brigade commander.  
The ability to decide to engage the enemy reflected the awareness, as a 
result of sensemaking and tacit knowledge of the situation, that the respondent had 
in the situation and the strength in trust he had with his own unit, but it also 
demonstrated the belief that trust was not being violated between him and his 
brigade commander. This scenario reflects the integrating effect of the four 
aggregate categories at play and resulted in an effective decision that was timely 
and of sufficient quality. The influence of the four aggregate categories led the 
decision maker to make a critical choice, which he felt to be the correct choice in that 
moment in time. The overwhelming confidence in that choice was related to the 
respondent’s perception of the conditions through sensemaking; trust in himself, his 
men, and his leadership; and his own knowledge of the conditions and what actions 
to take. The subconscious interaction of these factors allowed him to make a high 
velocity decision of sufficient quality and effect as evidenced by the outcome: 
“Great job. We saw it all on the predator. You guys did everything right.” 
Sample Scenario #3 
While the previous two scenarios seemed to reflect that a positive interaction 
between the four aggregate categories can lead to effective decisions, one is left to 
wonder if these categories could explain negative outcomes in decision making as 
well. In the following scenario, the respondent was told to split his team and 
reinforce another ODA that had been taking heavy casualties. While there are clear 
indications of all four categories being processed by the respondent, when one 
examines the narrative, it seems as if the team leader the respondent was tasked to 
support may have experienced a somewhat negative interaction between the four 
aggregate categories: 
He had just gotten hit with an IED that injured I think the team 
medic and one of the guys got evacuated out. I think that was the 
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straw that broke the camel’s back and cause the battalion 
commander to say, “hey, we’re going to push your team to this 
firebase and after this captain got hit.” … When I got over there, 
there was a real quick mission that we were going to do and he, 
surprisingly, didn’t want to go out. He said “I’m not going out today. 
You can go out with the team.” I was like not going to tell you not 
to go with your team… the guys would say “Can you believe that 
the captain wouldn’t go out with us? I mean, this is ridiculous. 
What kind of leader is this guy?” 
The choices made by the ODA team leader who was being supported by the 
respondent were not clear, but it is clear that his team took significant casualties. If 
the decisions that were being made by this team leader were not of sufficient quality, 
it could have led to non-effective decisions, leading to negative outcomes. The 
interaction of all four categories creates the reality for the decision maker that 
ultimately leads to an effective decision. The team member’s response to an 
altercation between the respondent and the ODA team leader he was supporting 
was very telling with regard to the breakdown of at least one of the aggregate 
categories within the supported team leader’s decision environment: 
There is one time I spoke up in front of everyone after mission 
had been completed. Fratricide could easily have occurred 
based on what this guy had done, at least on his decisions to 
maneuver. When we got back, I said like “hey, what we saw 
today or what I saw today was absolutely ridiculous …” The 
guys like afterward said “thanks for doing that, because like 
nobody here can really get to our captain.” I think he needed 
to hear something like that from another officer. 
It is clear that the ODA team leader being supported lacked a positive trust 
environment which could have influenced other aspects of his ability to formulate a 
clear understanding or acceptance of the decision environment leading to negative 
consequences. While this is only a supposition, in that we were unable to interview 
the supported ODA team leader, it is consistent with the understanding of the 
presence of and relationship between the four categories in all of the other 
interviews conducted for this research. 
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Consolidated Data Summary 
While the timelines and circumstances for the various chaotic events varied 
across all of the subject interviews, the general nature was similar in that the 
respondents described chaotic and complex circumstances in which they had to 
make deliberate decisions based upon limited information. As I decomposed their 
situations and began to code their narratives, there seemed to be a finite set of 
characteristics emerging and interacting that helped to shape their actions. The 
decisions they made were both conscious and subconscious, in that often their 
deliberate actions without apparent deliberation seemed to be second nature. While 
virtually all of the respondents attributed this to “good training,” further analysis 
suggests the presence of more than just training.  
The respondents consistently displayed the influence of all four aggregate 
categories during the time frame in which they were responding to immediate 
chaotic circumstance. While training manifested as explicit knowledge and allowed 
the respondents to perform certain actions with little thought, tacit knowledge and 
trust reinforced this knowledge with the sense that they simply “knew” what to do 
based upon their instincts. Charging an ambush, for example, in Scenario 2 was 
reflective of this innate knowledge: The decision was shaped by trust in self, 
perceived trust from superiors, and trust in the team that was reinforced by training 
and an evolved sense of the current situation, indicating the continuous interaction of 
sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge. Figure 3 shows a 
summary of the number of times I was able to identify the influence of the four 
aggregate categories during the specific chaotic decision-making window for each of 
the interviewees. 
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Figure 3: Summary of the Total Number of Observations of the 
Aggregate Categories during a Chaotic Decision-Making Window for All 
Interviewees 
Sensemaking and trust seem to be the most prominent categories influencing 
the respondent during the specific decision-making events, with tacit and explicit 
knowledge manifesting significantly across all of the chaotic events in relatively 
equal value. Figure 4 further shows the distribution and number of observations of 
the second-order codes that emerged during the coding process that helped to 
define the aggregate categories. Examining the individual second-order codes in 
relation to each other, there appears to be a higher influence of trust and 
sensemaking when compared to the other attributes. 
 
Figure 4: Second-Order Code Summary by Number of 
Observations for All Interviewees 
         Sensemaking                   Trust                     Tacit Knowledge          Explicit Knowledge 
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Discussion 
Sonenshein (2007) begins to address the notion that individuals make 
intuitive judgements in their construction of ethical decisions and suggests that 
responses to ethical issues are not always based on deliberate and extensive moral 
reasoning. One can extrapolate from his research that individuals also make intuitive 
judgements in ambiguous decision-making environments, which ultimately involves 
ethical and logical choices. While Sonenshein (2007) suggests that individuals are 
engaging in sensemaking (Weick, 1979) under conditions of equivocality, I further 
suggest that, consistent with Hypothesis 1, initial findings from these interviews 
reinforce the notion that decision makers are inherently influenced by the four 
aggregate categories of sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit 
knowledge.  
What remains to be seen is whether or not these same categories manifest 
themselves across leaders from different functional environments. If individuals 
develop their sense of reality similarly, regardless of the functional environment in 
which they make decisions, this could lead us to questioning the emphasis of 
focusing on leadership issues as a root cause of defense program failure. One has 
to then turn to the actual functional constraints of the environment and assess the 
impact of the actual decision-making environment on program outcomes. If leaders 
develop their foundation and sense of clarity in similar ways, yet perform differently 
in different functional constructs, this might even suggest that leaders that are 
successful in one complex environment may be less successful in others such as 
the program environment. 
The second round of interviews will consist primarily of current and former 
program managers. Their results will be compared to current data in an effort to 
establish a sense of validity to the theoretical construct. If data reveals itself as 
consistent with the emerging results of the Special Operations Forces interviews, 
this will reinforce the preliminary findings in support of Hypotheses 1 and 2 and set 
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the conditions for Phase II, in which the functional construct of the individual’s 
environment is compared with the conceptual Nousmaking. 
There does seem to be a relationship emerging between speed and quality of 
decision making. From the initial round of interviews, speed and quality seemed to 
manifest itself and have some relation to performance. It is still unclear what the 
relationship between speed, quality, and Nousmaking are with regard to the overall 
decision-making process. As more data is collected and the functional environmental 
constraints are applied to the process, this relationship will gain additional clarity. By 
understanding how an individual establishes a sense of reality and how the 
functional constructs of the individual’s environment interact with this sense of 
reality, we hope to better understand how individuals make effective decisions and 
how the outcomes of these decisions are impacted by speed and quality. This leads 
us to yet a third hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 3: Speed and quality of decision making have a direct 
relationship with the positive or negative impact of the decision and are 
influenced by the aggregate categories of Nousmaking. 
  
The velocity and quality of the decision is influenced by the decision maker’s 
sense of reality and perceived outcome based upon the functional construct and 
clarity. Figure 5 represents the relationship between Nousmaking and decision 




Figure 5: Interactive Relationship Between Four Aggregate Categories and Decision 
Effectiveness 
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If decisions are made rapidly but are not reinforced with a level of clarity that 
informs the quality of the decision, then the overall effectiveness of the decision 
could be compromised. Additionally, if the quality of the choices is sufficiently high, 
but the decision comes late, then the effectiveness is also hampered. For example, 
in the case of Sample Scenario #1, although the respondent could have reached a 
level of understanding regarding the choice to be made, his overall reality of the 
situation with regard to the urgency was not sufficiently realized. In this case, I 
suggest that the combined effect of the four categories, in which a reality of the 
environment due to the interaction of the four categories resulted in a high velocity 
and high quality decision, ultimately led to an effective decision and outcome. 
Kathleen Eisenhardt (1989) revealed in her article, Making Fast Strategic 
Decisions in High-Velocity Environments, that fast decision makers use more, not 
less information than slow decision makers. Additionally, the greater the number of 
alternatives that are considered simultaneously, the greater the speed of the 
strategic decision. Her research showed that executives immersed themselves in 
real-time information about their environment and their firm’s operations. The result 
of this, according to Eisenhardt, was a deep personal knowledge of the enterprise 
that allows for rapid decision making. Consequently, the greater the speed of the 
strategic decision process, the greater the performance in high-velocity 
environments (Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The relationship between performance and speed is illustrated in figure 6, in 
which Eisenhardt illustrates the interdependencies of the mediating processes 
necessary for speedy high performance decisions. The data presented in this paper 
takes Eisenhardt’s reasoning a bit further by offering a definitive relationship 
between the tangible and intangible qualities of decision making in high velocity and 
chaotic environments and their relationship to effective decisions. Within the context 
of Eisenhardt’s model, this would further explain the key mediating processes to 
reflect the relationship between the key mediating processes and the aggregate 
categories process described in this paper. 
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Figure 6: Relationship Between Eisenhardt (1989) Model of Strategic Decision 
Speed in High-Velocity Environments, With Aggregate Categories 
In essence, the decision maker is determining what is real through the 
interaction of the four aggregate categories that emerged from the respondent data, 
and subsequently acting on this understanding. The degree to which the decision 
maker optimizes the aggregate categories and is able to make a timely and high 
quality decision determines the overall effectiveness of the decision. As we examine 
more interview data for PMs, we will be able to establish a theoretical basis from 
which to begin Phase II. Phase II will examine the causal relationship between 
Nousmaking and the functional environmental construct in which the individual 
makes decisions. The interdependent nature of Nousmaking and decision making 
within a functional environment will be revealed, allowing us to design subsequent 
experiments that examine the effects of varying either the Nousmaking or functional 
environment and the subsequent impact on the speed and quality of the decision-
making process. 
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Conclusion 
The theory presented in this paper represents a qualitative ethnographic 
study of a group that has the propensity to be required to make life-altering decisions 
in time-constrained chaotic and complex environments. While this data focused on 
SoF soldiers, the underlying factors of Nousmaking are presumed to be independent 
of the functional environmental construct of the participants. While one could dismiss 
their ability to operate in these environments successfully as a function of their 
significant training, the results of this study reflect a higher level of cognitive 
processing that leads to effective decisions and subsequent performance. Using the 
grounded theory approach to qualitative analysis, interviewees were asked to 
describe chaotic events during combat situations, in which they were required to 
make critical decisions. From their stories, I was able to conduct first- and second-
order coding from which a theoretical construct emerged to help understand the 
nature of decision making in these environments. 
Four aggregate categories emerged as being relevant to almost all of the 
scenarios described by the interviewees. These four categories included 
sensemaking, trust, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge. At some point during 
the decision-making windows, the interviewee exhibited signs that at least one of 
these categories was at play and facilitated the actions at the moment. Recognizing 
that decision making is a dynamic process, the interaction of these categories likely 
played a significant role in helping to shape the interviewee’s reality of the 
environment, involving a perception of the current conditions; trust relationships with 
subordinates, peers, and superiors; and an innate self-confidence and confidence in 
their own skills. For the purposes of helping to describe this interactive relationship, I 
termed this process Nousmaking, or perhaps more simply, reality making that 
provides a sense of clarity in action and purpose. 
Practical Impact and Future Research Opportunity 
Chaotic and complex decision-making environments are not limited to combat 
scenarios. Disasters and emergency situations are examples of decision-making 
environments that have potentially similar characteristics as combat environments in 
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that they reflect the unpredictability and nonlinearity of the situation relative to a 
more predictable steady state environment. The nonlinearity of these events in 
which human decision making is predicated by chaos may have certain similarities 
and patterns that can be studied with regard to their association with the individuals 
involved in the decision-making process. Complex and high risk business 
environments can also manifest themselves in a chaotic or unpredictable nature and 
could be subject to the same cognitive processes as combat. Eisenhardt’s (1989) 
study of high tech companies began to explore the relationship between fast and 
slow decision making and their potential outcomes. If we better understood the 
internal influencers that lead to making effective decisions in ambiguous 
environments, perhaps future organizational and leadership theory and methods 
could be better tailored to the environment, leading to more predictable outcomes. 
Future research should examine in much greater depth the theoretical nature 
of the Nousmaking process with the goal of mapping these interactions to their 
relative inputs and desired outputs. Although we will likely never accurately predict 
the nature of human decision making, better understanding of the integrated parts 
and their relationships to each other could provide greater insight into the ability to 
improving decision making across a full spectrum of complex environments. 
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